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.ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE: The Complementary Roles of Rule and 
Discretion. By Milton Handler. New York: Columbia University Press. 
1957. Pp. 151. $3.00. 
The distinguished author is one who enjoys a nation-wide franchise 
for anything he writes on antitrust law. When he offers a "perspective" for 
this many-dimensioned field, he therefore commands careful attention. 
Twice before he has marked off the boundaries with comprehensive skill-
in the first edition of his casebook in 1937, and in the remarkable T.N.E.C. 
monograph of 1940. To him and to Professor Oppenheim of Michigan, a 
generation of students and lawyers largely owe their antitrust frame of 
reference. 
This short book (the James McCormick Mitchell lectures given at 
the University of Buffalo School of Law) attempts no new comprehensive 
survey. It does attempt, however, a general standard for modem antitrust 
administration. The author argues for the overriding principle of judicial 
discretion in the application of both the Sherman and the Clayton Acts. 
This principle requires a full appraisal of the facts in all but the most 
extreme cases in order to ascertain whether the challenged transaction is 
compatible with the "precepts" of competition. 
In an interesting first chapter, with many valuable notes appended, 
the author traces the emergence of this principle in the form of the 
"Rule of Reason" from the conflicting views of a series of great justices 
whom he indentifies as "the outstanding representatives of the main 
schools of antitrust thought" (White, Peckham, Taft, Holmes, Brandeis, 
and Stone). This selection of "architects" is a tolerant one indeed, for 
it includes one who rejected the Rule of Reason entirely (Peckham), 
one whose scholarly but unworkable dichotomy would have destroyed it 
(Taft), and one who thought that the whole policy with or without 
judicial discretion was a monument to ignorance (Holmes). The inter-
action of their views with the more profound approaches of White, 
Brandeis, and Stone, however, contributed in the author's view to the 
ultimate forging of the rule. This somewhat romantic treatment may not 
fully quell the suspicion that some of these justices contributed more to 
confusion in this field than to enlightenment (e.g., Holmes, in Northern 
Securities, Federal Baseball, American Banana). But it sets nevertheless 
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a broad stage for the author's criticism of more recent developments in 
the Clayton Act field. 
Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, subject to the somewhat lower 
standard of competitive harm set by Congress, should be interpreted in 
the Rule of Reason manner, the author argues. The much-harassed Standard 
Stations opinion on exclusive dealing is an inexcusable departure. Recent 
contentions for similar "quantitative substantiality" construction of the 
amended anti-merger section are equally objectionable. The author plainly 
fears that "per se" application of these sections may do incalculable harm 
to legitimate business and competitive moves. It is odd that, having estab-
lished this context, he does not go on to examine the Robinson-Patman 
Act in the same way. The book is silent on this pinnacle of per seism. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act receives a similar snub. 
Although the author is a strong admirer of antitrust in the abstract, and 
although he is troubled by what he sees in some recent developments, 
the concrete view which his perspective uncovers must be even less to 
his -liking than he admits. I£ judicial discretion and full appraisal of 
economic facts are necessary to proper administration of most Sherman 
and Clayton Act cases, the policy has wandered badly astray. The great 
majority of Sherman Act cases have been made by the courts to fit into 
one of the growing list of "per se" categories (as I count them-price 
fixing, division of territory, division of fields, limitation of output, tying 
and boycotts, with monopoly teetering on the brink). It is true that there 
have been some full-blown reasonableness cases, and there would be many 
more were it not for the natural preference of plaintiffs for "per se" 
theories. But the policy, after 68 years, must be judged by what we see in 
the cases, and what we see looks more like a rule of "per se" with a little 
room left for occasional "reasonableness." 
In the one major Sherman Act area in which the Court has persisted 
in a full use of discretion-mergers-Congress has shown its dissatisfaction 
in the amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act, although it is clear that 
the amendment did not go all the way over to "per se." In interpretation 
of section 3, and section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, the courts have relentlessly dragged most of the substance 
into the non-discretionary fold. Of the major antitrust provisions, only 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act seems to stand fully 
equipped with almost pure discretion-but this is administrative, not 
judicial discretion. 
Many, including this observer, share the author's partly stated, partly 
implicit view that the courts have been going too fast and too far in cutting 
off inquiry into the economic consequences of some of the things now 
made invalid by . "per se" doctrines. It does not follow, as the author 
seems to believe, that the remedy is a simple reinvigoration of the phil-
osophy of discretion. Some of the drive toward inquiry-stopping rules 
is due to nothing more than the growing impatience of federal judges 
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with the docket-wrecking propensities of lo"ng, "big" cases. The remedy 
for this is not legal theory, but rather more judges. 
Some-of·the·"per se" movement, however, is due to increasing judicial 
discomfort about the standards supposedly available to a judge who sets 
out bravely to exercise his full powers of reason. The "precepts" of competi-
tion may once have seemed sufficiently clear to serve as an adequate guide, 
when placed against the contrasting darkness of the bad "trust" and the 
conspiracy to mulct the public. With the coming of greater business moral-
ity and new schools of economic thought, however, the difference between 
good and bad has become considerably dulled. The resulting closer focus 
on the concept of competition itself has shown.not a single guiding image, 
but· a bewildering multiplicity. of images-pure competition, effective 
competition, tountervailing power, political· anti-bigness, social anti-
pluralism, civil freedom of enterprise, and so on. These partly divergent 
standards are• themselves under the constant pressure of other powerful 
forces-requirements of national defense, fiscal control of inflation, ten-
dencies toward more positive regulation of industry, collective bargaining, 
price supports, paternalism toward sma,ll business and agriculture, and 
so forth. 
It is perhaps not surprising that courts and Congress alike keep looking 
for the shelter of rules which will at least temporarily relieve the agony 
of trying to balance all these phenomena anew in every case. This may 
be what ]llstice Frankfurter was trying to say in Standard Stations; if so, 
be ought to be added to the list of representatives of the main schools of 
~ntitrust thought. 
We can agree with the author that antitrust is a "basic instrument of 
social control:" It has a long record of specific accomplishments; it has 
been a major factor in freeing the dynamic forces of our economy for their 
stupendolls gains; it is the present envy and model of the nations of the 
Western World. Its genius must be saved from those who would reduce 
it to a set of blind rules, and from those who ·would drown it in an insipid 
discretionary stew. It is to be hoped that the author and others like him 
will draw upon their vast experience and insight to supply the perspective 
so badly needed to accomplish this. 
]am<:s A.. Rahl, 
Professor of Law, 
Northwest<:171- University 
